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COMMENT 
EYE ON ISLAM: JUDICIAL SCRUTINY ALONG THE 
RELIGIOUS PROFILING/SUSPECT DESCRIPTION RELIANCE 
SPECTRUM 
LUCAS McMILLEN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Immediately after the September 11 th terrorist attacks, Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft converted the Federal Bureau of Investigation into a 
counterterrorism agency: "That day, in those early hours," said Ashcroft in 
a 2002 press conference announcing the Bureau's reorientation, "the pre-
vention of terrorist acts became the central goal of the law enforcement and 
national security mission of the FBI."l But, while Ashcroft may have prop-
erly redirected the FBI toward confronting the primary threat to United 
States safety and security, his identification of our enemy was not as partic-
ular as it could have been. In 2004, the 9111 Commission aimed for further 
clarity: 
[T]he enemy is not just "terrorism," some generic evil. This 
vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this mo-
ment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist 
terrorism-especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its 
ideology. 2 
Indeed, no characteristic unites the perpetrators of recent terrorist acts 
so much as their Muslim identity. Middle Eastern nationality may be 
thought to provide the link, but this trait proves to be underinclusive: to 
name just a few examples, Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," is a Muslim 
who was born and educated in the United Kingdom,3 as were the four July 
>I< J.D. May 2006. 
I. John Ashcroft, Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft (May 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/newsl2002l05/ag053002.html; see also Robert S. Mueller III, The FBI's 
New Mission: Preventing Terrorist Attacks While Protecting Civil Liberties, Address of the Direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Occasion of the Jackson H. Ralston Price Cere-
mony (Oct. 18, 2(02), in 39 STAN. J. lNr'L L. 117 (2003). 
2. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATIACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9111 COMMISSION 
REPoRT 362 (2004), available at http://www.9-1Icommission.gov/reportl911Report.pdf(italics in 
original)(footnotes omitted). 
3. Richard Reid Pleads Guilty, CNN, Jan. 22, 2003, http://archives.cnn.coml2002ILAW/10/ 
04/reid.guilty .plea/index.html. 
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7th London Underground bombers.4 Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person to 
be charged and convicted by United States courts in connection with the 
September 11th terrorist attacks, is a French Muslim.5 Earnest James 
Ujaama, an indicted al-Qaeda associate, is a Muslim convert who was born 
in Denver and raised in Seattle.6 Furthermore, of the twenty-six terrorists 
currently on the FBI's Most Wanted List, three are from the Philippines; 
two are from Kenya; one, Abdul Rahman Yasin, is from Indiana-all are 
Muslims.7 
Nor does Arab ethnicity serve as a reliably accurate terrorist-identify-
ing characteristic: on December 5th, 2005, a white woman who was raised 
as a Catholic in Belgium became the fIrst European Muslim suicide bomber 
when she detonated herself in Baquba.8 Indeed, the use of stereotype-defy-
ing terrorist operatives is entirely consistent with al-Qaeda's expressed in-
tent to employ deceptive tactics in carrying out its attacks.9 Of course, the 
one characteristic that Islamist radicals cannot obscure by selective con-
scription is Islamic identity. Accordingly, Muslim identity should be con-
sidered the attribute that correlates most positively with terrorist 
involvement; or, in the words of Abdel Rahman aI-Rashed, the general 
manager of AI-Arabiya, a top pan-Arab television station in the Middle 
East,lO "It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists. but it is 
equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are 
Muslims."ll 
Our question then becomes, what is the proper role for Muslim identity 
in our law-enforcement offIcials' preventive counterterrorism efforts? It is a 
4. Matthew Chance, Britain's Home-Grown Terrorists, CNN, July 14, 2005, http://www. 
cnn.coml2005IWORLD/europel07/14Ihomegrown.teITor/. 
5. Phil Hirschkom, Jury Spares 9111 Plotter Moussaoui, CNN, May 3, 2006, http://www. 
cnn.coml2006/LAW I05103/moussaoui. verdictlindex.hlml. 
6. Kelli Arena, Seattle Man Indicted on Terror Charges, CNN, Sept. 3, 2002, http:// 
archives.cnn.coml2002ILAWIOSI2S/ujaama.indictmentlindex.html. 
7. FBI, Most Wanted Terrorists, http://www.fbi.gov/wantediteITorists/fugitives.htm (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2007). 
S. Craig S. Smith, More 'White Muslim' Female Suicide Bomber Converts expected-Bel-
gian Woman Bomber 'Was Anchored in Islmn', MILITANT ISLAM MONITOR, Dec. 6, 2005, http:// 
www.mililantislammonitor.orglarticle/idl1353. 
9. Richard H. Schultz, Jr. & Ruth Margolies Beitler, Tactical Deception and Strategic Sur-
prise in AI-Qai'Da's Operations, S MIDDLE E. REv. OF lNT'L AFF. 56 (2004), available at http:// 
meria.idc.ac.illjoumall2OO4/issue2ljvSn2a6.hlml. These deceptive tactics are rooted in the Islamic 
concept of taqiyya, which means "precautionary dissimulation and keeping one's convictions se-
cret." Id. at 5S. 
10. Samantha M. Shapiro, The War Inside the Arab Newsroom, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 2, 
2005, at 27, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2005/0 1I02lmagazineI02ARAB.html?ex=12624 
OS400&en=dcb356cbeSdead19&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland. 
11. Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, Innocent Religion is Now a Message of Hate, TELEGRAPH, 
Apr. 9, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uklnews/main.jhtml?xml=/newsl2004/09/05/wosse605.xml. 
See also Heather MacDonald, Homeland Security? Not Yet: Political Correctness Still Makes Us 
Pull Our Punches, CITY JOURNAL, Autumn 2004, available at http://www.city-joumal.orglhtmllI4 
_ 4_homeland.html. 
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question that calls for a survey of our Constitution as well as our con-
science, as the answer may compel us to contemplate taking permissible but 
regrettable measures against a particular religious group. In 1785, James 
Madison wrote: "[A just government] will be best supported by protecting 
every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand 
which protects his person and his property."12 But what shall be done when 
those two ideals are incompatible, when protecting persons and their prop-
erty requires the government to take action that may infringe on others' 
religious enjoyment? We are faced with bad (ostracizing Muslims) and 
worse (suffering another terrorist attack) choices, a predicament expressed 
in the dour words of the reliably relevant Winston Churchill, who, speaking 
in a different context, said, "We seem to be very near the bleak choice 
between War and Shame. My feeling is that we shall choose Shame, and 
then have War thrown in a little later on even more adverse terms than at 
present." 13 
To assist legal and law enforcement authorities in avoiding both 
Shame and War, this Article will aim to provide a legal framework allowing 
law enforcement officials greater flexibility in targeting religious groups. In 
doing so, it will focus exclusively on religious-group targeting and will not 
address the related issues of racial and ethnic profiling, which have been 
adequately covered by other commentators. 
I will begin by discussing the difference between acts of religious pro-
filing and acts of suspect description reliance, and then discuss how most 
acts of religious-group targeting can be plausibly characterized as either. 
Finally, I will recommend that courts adopt a view toward religious-group 
targeting that allows law-enforcement officials greater flexibility in coun-
tering the Islamist terrorist threat. 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
"Religious profiling," in this Article, will be understood as the situa-
tion in which law-enforcement authorities act on the inference that a partic-
ular adherent of a certain religion is more likely to engage in criminal or 
terrorist behavior than any particular adherent of another religion.14 Put an-
12. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 
(1785), available at http://religiousfreedom.lib. virginia.edulsacredlmadison_m&r_1785.html 
(describing reasons for his opposition to a bill for an ecumenical Virginia tax that would go 
toward supporting ministers of religious denominations). 
13. GRETCHEN RUBIN, FORTY WAYS TO LooK AT WINSTON CHURCHILL 60 (Ballantine Books 
2(03). Churchill was rebuking Neville Chamberlain for his appeasement strategy towards the 
Nazis. 
14. This definition is a modification of the Department of Justice's definition for racial pro-
filing: "Racial profiling rests on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one 
race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of other 
races or ethnicities." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: RACIAL PROFILING (2003), 
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profilin~faccsheet.pdf. 
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other way, acts of religious profiling stem from an unfair prejudice towards 
members of a religious group, a prejudice that attributes criminal or terror-
istic propensities to all members of the group. But discriminatory bias will 
not account for all counterterrorist action based on the trait of Muslim iden-
tity. Muslim identity can simply be a part of a suspect description, and be as 
legitimate a trait for the police to rely upon in targeting potential suspects as 
height. weight. gender, or skin color. This Article's next section will discuss 
the difference between religious profiling and suspect description reliance, a 
difference that becomes crucial when determining the degree of judicial 
scrutiny to give police action that targets Muslims. 
A. Suspect Description Reliance, Religious Profiling, and the Question 
of Discrimination 
Profiling-understood as presuming a person's criminal propensity 
from their membership in a particular group-is located at the unconstitu-
tional end of the investigative-technique gamut. The other end of this spec-
trum is maintained by the permissible and wholly logical law-enforcement 
technique of relying on suspect descriptions. Whether a court will consider 
law-enforcement targeting of Muslims to be unconstitutional will largely 
tum on which end of the suspect description reliance/religious profiling 
spectrum that the court locates the targeting, as religious profiling will trig-
ger the nearly insurmountable strict scrutiny, while suspect description reli-
ance triggers the deferential rational basis scrutiny. 
Suspect description reliance is the rather simple concept that police 
officers, in choosing whom to investigate, may take into account certain 
characteristics-e.g., race, gender, physical markings, visible religious 
manifestations-because those characteristics match the physical descrip-
tion of the suspect provided by a victim or witness. 15 Such a technique is 
neither invidious nor unconstitutional; it is, simply put, "police work." For 
example, if a white robbery suspect is seen running into a bar where only 
three of the bar's patrons are white, the sole fact that the three men are 
white undoubtedly provides the police with the reasonable suspicion needed 
to justify detaining those men (or even probable cause justifying their ar-
rest).16 While this police action involves targeting persons based on race, it 
is not "profiling" -presuming criminality from group membership; it is 
seeking and arresting individuals who match the suspect's description, 
which in this case happens to be based on race. 
Though legally unproblematic, police actions based on suspect 
description reliance are often plagued by the same concerns that trouble us 
15. R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1201 
(2004) (offering overview of the divide between profiling/suspect description). 
16. Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1413, 1428 (2002) (offering this example). 
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about profiling: particularly, imposing the ignominy of being an investiga-
tory target on members of a class of people, the overwhelming majority of 
whom are innocent. When police take action against a vast suspect pool-
which generally becomes vaster with the fewer number of characteristics 
deemed actionable-it becomes difficult to discern which police actions are 
based on the suspect description and which on wrongful discrimination. The 
Second Circuit's decision in Brown v. City of Oneonta, New York17 illus-
trates both the distinction between suspect description reliance and profiling 
and the specter of discrimination both share. 
In the small New York town of Oneonta, in her home and in the dark, 
an elderly woman was attacked by an assailant whom she could only iden-
tify as a young black male with a cut on his hand. 18 In response, the police 
obtained a list of all black male students at the local college, found them, 
and then questioned them and inspected their hands for cutS.19 They also 
conducted a sweep of the streets of Oneonta, questioning, in all, more than 
two hundred non-white persons and inspecting their hands for cuts?O Both 
efforts were utterly fruitless, except for producing a class action by the in-
terviewees based on, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause? 1 
In dismissing the interviewees' Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Sec-
ond Circuit enforced two principles that are relevant to a religious-group 
targeting analysis. First, the court held that the police's dragnet was not 
actionable under the Equal Protection Clause because it was based on a 
suspect description. Selecting black persons for questioning was not a racial 
classification triggering scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the 
court held, it was a "legitimate classification within which potential sus-
pects might be found."22 The court further noted that the physical character-
istics that guided the police's investigatory choices were not, and could not 
have been, born of any police "profiling," as they "originated not with the 
state but with the victim."23 The first principle to draw from Oneonta, then, 
is that legitimate suspect description reliance, even when its scope is such 
as to include a large number of innocent people, is not to be considered 
"discrimination" triggering constitutional concerns. 
The caveat, though, is that not all acts of suspect description reliance 
will be reliably viewed as such: the second principle established by One-
onta that has relevance to our religious-group targeting analysis is that the 
line between legitimate suspect description reliance and profiling is so fine 
17. 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2(00), reh'g en bane denied, 235 F.3d 769. 770 (2d Cir. 2(00). 
18. Id. at 334. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 338. 
23. 221 F.3d 329. at 338. 
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that one can easily be viewed as the other. Even in the obviously non-"pro-
filing" case of Oneonta, the court, after taking notice of the indignation 
suffered by Oneonta's black residents as a result of the broad-sweeping 
investigation, cautioned the police on the profiling-related harms that such a 
dragnet can effect: "Law enforcement officials should always be cognizant 
of the impressions they leave on a community, lest distrust of law enforce-
ment undermine its effectiveness."24 Through this exhortation, the court is 
emphasizing the discriminatory specter of suspect description reliance, a 
specter that will increasingly resemble genuine discrimination when the de-
scriptions come to encompass large numbers of "suspects" and are anticipa-
tory, i.e., based on an estimation-albeit one empirically grounded-of 
who is likely to commit a crime. 
B. First and Fourteenth Amendments 
For the issue of religious-group targeting, of course, one must address 
an issue that Oneonta did not. While Oneonta's issue of racial profiling is a 
Fourteenth Amendment question exclusively, the issue of religious-group 
targeting-involving a potentially discriminatory infringement of religious 
exercise-represents a point of convergence for the protections of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.25 
When these two constitutional claims are collapsed, a court's analysis 
of them collapses as well, such that a court will use the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's analytical framework to evaluate the state's imposition on First 
Amendment free exercise rights. Put another way, in reviewing a poten-
tially unconstitutional state infringement on free exercise, a court will eval-
uate the infringement with one of two levels of scrutiny26: it will determine 
whether the infringement is either (1) rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment purpose ("rational basis scrutiny"),27 or (2) whether it is necessary 
to achieve a compelling government purpose ("strict scrutiny").28 The ques-
tion of which level of scrutiny will be applied is, of course, the crux of the 
matter, as rational basis scrutiny is enormously deferential, while strict 
scrutiny has generally proven to be, to quote Professor Gunther, "strict in 
theory and fatal in fact."29 
24. ld. at 339 (citation omitted). 
25. The criminal procedure issues of the Fourth Amendment, which may also be implicated 
when law enforcement officials target religious groups, are beyond this comment's scope. 
26. The Supreme Court has not carved out a role for "intermediate scrutiny" in the merged 
First-and-Fourteenth-Arnendment analysis. 
27. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). 
28. See. e.g .• Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
29. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,8 (1972). 
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1. Level of Scrutiny 
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,30 the 
Court employed the converged First-and-Fourteenth-Amendment analysis 
and established that its critical question of scrutiny turns on whether gov-
ernment officials, in imposing upon religious exercise, have done so with 
intent to suppress the targeted religion-discriminatory intent. 
At issue in Lukumi was the constitutionality of the City of Hialeah's 
animal sacrifice prohibition, a prohibition contained in a series of ordi-
nances that the city's Santeria practitioners challenged as being a thinly 
veiled effort to curtail their religious activities.3l Justice Kennedy, writing 
for the Lukumi majority, began describing the mechanics of the Court's 
merged First-and-Fourteenth-Amendment analysis by discussing Employ-
ment Division v. Smith,32 the case in which the Court gave a rational basis 
review to an Oregon peyote prohibition that frustrated Native American re-
ligious practice.33 According to Kennedy, Smith establishes the first direc-
tion that a court can take in the merged analysis: when it finds that 
conditions similar to those in Smith are present-Le., when the state's ac-
tion is neutrally postured towards religion-a court should review that ac-
tion with light scrutiny. To this effect, Kennedy wrote, "A law that is 
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening 
a particular religious practice."34 
Kennedy then continued, moving on to describe the second direction 
of the merged analysis, which he deemed to be the proper direction to take 
in Lukumi: when a court finds that the conditions of Smith are not met, such 
that discriminatory intent is the state action's raison d'etre, the state's ac-
tion will be subjected to strict scrutiny. KeImedy worded the second direc-
tion this way: "If the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices 
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral; and it is invalid 
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest."3s Ultimately, the Court determined that discrimina-
tory intent lay behind Lukumi's animal sacrifice prohibition-that it "had as 
[its] object the suppression of religion"-and struck it down as 
unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, from Kennedy's description of the mechanics of the 
Smith and Lukumi First-and-Fourteenth-Amendment merged analysis, we 
know that: per Lukumi, government action that is found to be discriminato-
rily motivated towards a particular religious group will be subjected to strict 
30. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
31. ld. at 521-29. 
32. 494 U.S. 872. 888 (1990). 
33. ld. 
34. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye. 508 U.S. at 531. 
35. ld. at 533 (citations omitted). 
2006] EYE ON ISLAM 121 
scrutiny. Per Smith, government action that has an incidental adverse im-
pact on religious practice-action that is neutral and generally applicable-
will receive rational basis scrutiny. 
2. Smith, Lukumi, and the Religious Profiling/Suspect Description 
Reliance Divide 
Having established the means for determining the applicable level of 
scrutiny in a merged First-and-Fourteenth-Amendment claim, we can return 
to our discussion of the profiling/suspect description reliance divide and put 
that discussion into the context of religious-group targeting. 
Parenthetically, though, let us first note that just as certain police ac-
tion can straddle the line between racial profiling and suspect description 
reliance based on race (as Oneonta illustrates), so too can police action 
straddle the line between religious profiling and suspect description reliance 
based on religion. The scenarios presented in the following pages should 
help to illustrate this ambiguity. 
Now, moving on to discuss religious-group targeting and the Smithl 
Lukumi merged analysis: Recall that from Oneonta, we established that sus-
pect description reliance based on race does not equate to "discrimination" 
based on race-that's why the Oneonta court did not subject the police 
dragnet to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. Analogously, 
suspect description reliance based on religion should not be considered 
"discrimination" based on religion, and so it should not trigger strict scru-
tiny under Lukumi. Instead, suspect description reliance based on religion 
should be considered "generally applicable and neutral" toward religion 
(even if accompanied by an incidental adverse impact on religion), warrant-
ing mere rational basis scrutiny under Smith. On the other hand, if police 
action is indeed religious profiling-presuming criminality or an inclination 
to commit terrorist acts based on an individual's religion-then that act is 
discrimination and should warrant Lukumi strict scrutiny. 
Also important to remember is our second Oneonta principle: when 
police action is based on preventing threats at higher levels of abstraction, 
and entails acting against large numbers of people based on a suspect 
description containing only a small number of characteristics, it becomes 
difficult to determine if police action is truly suspect description reliance or 
if it is motivated by unconstitutional prejudice. 
To demonstrate this ambiguity, I will set forth three scenarios-scena-
rios with facts offering varying degrees of threat abstraction and suspect 
specificity-in which law enforcement officials are targeting individuals 
based on their Muslim identity. 36 I will then discuss how a court can choose 
to deem the officials' conduct suspect description reliance and evaluate it 
36. The scenarios presented are adapted for a religious profiling analysis from the scenarios 
offered in another article on racial profiling: Roger Clegg & Keith Noreika, Racial Profiling, 
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with Smith rational basis scrutiny, or deem it religious profiling and evalu-
ate it with Lukumi strict scrutiny. Although some of the police action de-
picted in these scenarios may not actually inflict legally cognizable harms 
on the Muslim targets, nevertheless, all the police action depicted could 
potentially have a chilling effect on Muslim free exercise rights. It is impor-
tant for legal commentators to address this potential chilling effect, as it is 
our responsibility to contemplate what relationship the government should 
have with its citizens, and to develop ways to think: about our legal struc-
tures to effect the relationship we want. 
The scenarios are set forth below:37 
Scenario 1: Specific Threat, Specific Muslim Suspects. A promi-
nent government official receives a threatening letter laced with 
anthrax bacteria. The letter reads, "Now you know of our power 
and capacity, granted by Allah, to attack you when and how we 
want, as the Prophet demands of US."38 A forensic analysis of the 
anthrax spores reveals that only university-level microbiologists 
would have access to the equipment and chemicals necessary to 
cultivate and deliver the contaminant. As the letter was mailed 
from a mailbox in Rolla, Missouri, the police begin to surveil the 
small number of Muslims who work within the University of 
Missouri's biology department, observing and recording their 
public activities. 
Scenario 2: Specific Threat, Non-Specific Muslim Suspects. Relia-
ble evidence indicates that al-Qaeda terrorists are planning a 
chemical attack on St. Louis using a crop-dusting plane. In re-
sponse, the FBI contacts its agents in the Midwest who have been 
surveilling mosques and asks these agents for detailed descriptive 
information on all Caucasian persons who have been attending 
mosques recently. The FBI then gives this descriptive information 
to all businesses in the Midwest that rent crop-dusters and directs 
these businesses not to rent crop-dusters to these individuals. 
A white man fitting one of the FBI's detailed descriptions shows 
up at one of these plane-renting establishments and asks to rent a 
Equal Protection, and the War Against Terrorism (2003), http://www.fed-soc.orgfPublications/ 
Terrorismlraciaiprofiling.htm. 
37. Other scenarios in which the constitutionality of religious-group targeting would be an 
issue can be conceived. For example, a series of abortion-clinic bombings could trigger investiga-
tions into certain Christian groups. Or, Muslim prison chaplains may be subject to greater scrutiny 
in higher security environments than chaplains of other faiths. See Austin Cline, Feds to Screen 
Muslim Prison Chaplains? (2004), http://atheism.about.comlblal083989.htm. Or, law-enforce-
ment authorities may also target Catholic or other religious groups who have questioned the mo-
rality of the U.S. immigration system. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Bishop Calls For 
Reform Of 'Morally Unacceptable' Immigration System (July 27, 2005), http://www.usccb.org/ 
comm/archivesl2005/05-167.shtml. 
38. Spanish authorities received similarly worded messages after the Madrid train bombing. 
Lawrence Wright, The Terror Web, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2004, at 40, available at http://www. 
newyor!rer.comlprintableslfactl040802fa_fact. 
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crop-duster. Given the man's background (he owns a large-acre-
age farm, has the necessary pilot's license, etc.), there is nothing 
unusual about the request. The rental-business refuses to rent to 
the man based on the FBI's directive. 
Scenario 3; General Threat, Non-Specific Muslim Suspects. After 
studying the March 11 Madrid bombing and the July 7 London 
bombings,39 the FBI determines to take measures to identify and 
intercept ad-hoc domestic terrorist-emulators: small groups of dis-
affected Muslim youths who are ideologically aligned with al-
Qaeda but who have few links to any international terrorist net-
works.40 To learn more about such individuals, the FBI begins 
efforts to conduct voluntary interviews with members of the Mus-
lim community in high-risk areas such as New York and Wash-
ington, D.C. 
C. The Two Views 
123 
For the most part, the police action in all three scenarios could be plau-
sibly viewed as belonging on either side of the suspect description reliancel 
religious profiling divide. In what follows, I will present the scenarios in the 
context of each party's view-the law-enforcement officers' view that their 
actions are merely based on suspect descriptions, and the Muslim suspects' 
view that the officers' actions constitute religious profiling. I will then dis-
cuss how a court would analyze the scenarios under the Smith rational basis 
scrutiny effected by the law-enforcement officers' view, and the Lukumi 
strict scrutiny effected by Muslim suspects' view. To conclude, I will dis-
cuss which view should prevail given the current national security 
environment. 
1. View 1: The Police Action Constitutes Suspect Description 
Reliance 
This first view ("View 1") holds that none of the police action depicted 
in the scenarios constitutes profiling-that is. in none of these situations did 
the officials select these individuals for investigation based upon the pre-
sumption that, because of their Islamic identity, they have a propensity to 
commit terrorist acts. Rather, this view holds, these investigative efforts are 
based on the fact that Muslim identity is the predominant feature of a sus-
pect description, a description created from the best evidence available of 
who the terrorist perpetrators are likely to be. Accordingly, under this view, 
the police action described in these scenarios is not "discriminatory" as that 
term is understood in the context of the merged First-and-Fourteenth-
39. Both terrorist acts were perpetrated by such small, loosely-affiliated terrorist groups. 
Marc Sagernan, Understanding Terror Networks (Nov. 1.2004), http://www.fpri.org/enotesl2004 
1101.rniddleeast.sagernan.understandingterrometworks.htrnl. 
40. ld.; Wright. supra note 38. 
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Amendment analysis, and so to the extent the police action infringes on 
Muslims' free exercise rights, a court should evaluate this infringement us-
ing Smith rational basis scrutiny. 
i. Applying View 1 (Presumption of Suspect Description 
Reliance) to the Scenarios 
View 1 is most compatible with police targeting of Muslims when the 
police are responding to a specific threat and suspect description, as exem-
plified in Scenarios 1 and 2. In Scenario 1, the composition of the anthrax, 
the explicit references to Islam in the language of the letter received with 
the anthrax, and the mailing location of the letter inform investigators that 
the threat involves Islamic biologists who are most likely working within, 
or have a connection to, Missouri's principal university. Given the particu-
larity of this evidence, it becomes more difficult to view the targeting of 
Muslims in the university's biology department (using more intensive mea-
sures against them than against the non-Muslim biologists) as based on 
some stereotype about the terrorist propensities of Muslim biologists. 
Rather, the facts are readily conformable to the view that the investigators 
are taking action against Muslims because Muslim identity (along with bio-
logical know-how) is the predominant characteristic in the anthrax terror-
ist's suspect description. 
Specificity of the threat is also the feature that makes View 1 easily 
applicable to Scenario 2. The FBI knows that the crop-duster attack will be 
perpetrated by a member of a specific terrorist network, al-Qaeda, that con-
sists entirely of Muslim persons.41 By blocking the rental of crop-dusters to 
Muslims, then, the FBI should not be seen to be acting on a prejudiced 
imputation of terrorist motives to all Muslims; rather, they should be seen 
as acting based on a suspect description that (however unfortunately) con-
tains only one ineluctable characteristic, Muslim identity. 
Finally, View 1 can also be applied to situations in which the threat is 
more abstract, such as in Scenario 3. For adherents of View 1, the Muslim-
interview campaign is simply based on a new, empirically grounded under-
standing of global Islamist terrorist operations-one whereby the simplest 
and most straightforward means of identifying and intercepting such opera-
tions involves speaking with Muslims about any knowledge they may have 
about likely perpetrators of terrorist acts. The FBI's operating assumption 
with regard to the interviewees, adherents to View 1 will point out, is that 
they are not terrorists-so, for adherents of View 1, the FBI is not imputing 
terrorist motives to Muslims as a category, they are simply acting on the 
knowledge that particular Muslims pose a threat, and that it is probable that 
41. See Peter Bergen, Excerpt: The Osama bin Laden I Know (Jan. 18,2006), http://www. 
tpmcafe.comlstoryI200611118/13810n770 ("Al Qaeda is basically an organized Islamic faction; its 
goal will be to lift the word of God, to make His religion victorious."). 
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other Muslims will have knowledge that could help identify who those par-
ticular Muslims are. Thus, for adherents of View 1. the interview campaign 
is based on a suspect description, and has nothing to do with a discrimina-
tory prejudice towards Muslims. 
ii. Evaluating the Law Enforcement Action Under Rational 
Basis Scrutiny 
If a court adopts View 1 toward the law-enforcement officials' ac-
tions-<ieeming them acts of suspect description reliance and not ascribing 
any prejudicial motive to them-it will review the actions with Smith ra-
tional basis scrutiny, requiring the officials to demonstrate that their actions 
are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Of course, this 
rational basis inquiry will tum entirely on the rational relation component, 
as the officials' purpose-achieving national security-unquestionably 
constitutes a legitimate. indeed. compelling, government interest. 42 
When the threat is specific, as in Scenarios 1 and 2. the law-enforce-
ment officials should have no trouble demonstrating that their actions are 
rationally related to pursuing national security interests. With the threat so 
concrete, and the successive steps to actualizing the threat so easily cogni-
zable, it is obvious that national security interests are furthered by surveil-
ling suspected anthrax terrorists and disallowing a legitimate terror suspect 
to rent an instrument of destruction. 
Nor will Scenario 3's voluntary Muslim-interview campaign be 
deemed an irrational technique with which to pursue national security inter-
ests, though the Muslims challenging such a campaign will likely have nu-
merous amici join them in contesting its rationality. Many commentators 
have decried group-based interview campaigns, questioning the efficacy of 
targeting a large group to apprehend a few dangerous individuals. For ex-
ample, Professor Tom Lininger wrote, "The tiny proportion of terrorists 
among U.S. Muslims does not furnish any credible basis for religious pro-
filing," after citing William Blake's observation, ''To Generalize is to be an 
Idiot"43 Others argue that targeting Muslims as a group for an information-
gathering interview campaign is an inefficient use of law-enforcement re-
sources because radical Islamists, in keeping with the terrorist's strategy of 
deception, do not express their malevolent purposes public1y.44 Still others 
42. See Korematsu v. U.S .• 323 U.S. 214. 218 (1944); Hirabayashi v. U.S .• 320 U.S. 81. 
100--01 (1943); see also Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968). Of course, Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi are nearly universally condemned today, but this condemnation is based on the fact 
that the Supreme Court approved a program that was not at all narrowly tailored to achieve na-
tional security_ The Court's affinnation in these cases that national security is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest is universally recognized as valid. 
43. Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious 
Groups, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1201, 1285 n. 213 (2004). 
44. Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and 
the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 621, 659 (2004). 
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argue that targeting Muslims for investigation only serves to antagonize and 
ostracize Muslims and their leaders, individuals whose cooperation with the 
government-not their alienation from it-would be valuable in the coun-
try's national security efforts.45 
But none of these objections undermine the fundamental rationality of 
the government's undertaking an information-gathering interview campaign 
during a war in which the government's best defense against the enemy is 
good intelligence. In defending the FBI's voluntary interview program of 
Arab-Americans in 2002, John Bell, the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI 
for the state of Michigan, put it this way: 
A terrorist organization[,] like a business organization or any 
other criminal enterpriser,] has got to recruit and its got to expand 
its membership if it's going to thrive and it's going to function. 
So what were the purposes of the interviews? ... [T]o identify 
AI-Qaeda leadership and members, and to determine how the 
members were recruited, trained, and deployed. . . . [W]ho was 
the organization targeting? ... [W]ho was making the approach? 
... Where was the approach made? 
. . . What incentives were used to entice the members . . . 
[a]nd if they were financial what was the nature of the financial 
reward? ... [W]hat was the nature of the training that that indi-
vidual took and where was that training held? .. Why did we not 
know ahead of time that that 9-11 attack was planned? I'll tell 
you why[,] we didn't know because we didn't have the informa-
tion I've just listed.46 
The FBI does not undertake an interview program to incriminate interview-
ees, the FBI undertakes it to find out, in the words of columnist James 
Lileks, whether the interviewee "has a brother who [knows] some guys who 
have some sympathies with some guys who hang around some rather ener-
getic fellows who attend that one mosque where the [imam] talks about 
jihad 2417,"47 and whether such information could be useful in anticipating 
a terrorist attack. As such, the voluntary interview program should be re-
garded as sufficiently related to national security to pass muster under the 
rational basis test. 
2. View 2: The Actions of the Law-Enforcement Officers Constitute 
Profiling 
This second view ("View 2") holds that the actions of the law-enforce-
ment officials, in at least the second and third scenarios, constitute religious 
45. Stephen H. Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National Se-
curity and International Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 161, 180 (2005). 
46. John Bell, Comments on the FBI in the Wake of 9/11 and Legal Standards and Proce-
dures for Homeland Investigations, 10 MICH. ST. J. INr'L L. 552, 557-58 (2001). 
47. Posting of James Lileks, Screedblog (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.lileks.comlscreedblog/ 
06/02222406.htrnl. 
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profiling-that is, this view holds that the officials' actions in these scena-
rios are based on a stereotype that Muslims as a class are more prone to 
commit terrorist acts than non-Muslims. Because taking action based on a 
group stereotype equates to invidious discrimination, View 2 adherents ar-
gue that any group-targeting of Muslims that results in an infringement on 
Muslims' free exercise rights should be reviewed with Lukumi strict 
scrutiny. 
With regard to the facts of Scenario I-in which the Islamic refer-
ences in the anthrax letter give law-enforcement officials a specific reason 
to target Muslims-adherents of View 2, unable to characterize the offi-
cials' action in that scenario as "profiling," will argue for subjecting their 
actions to strict scrutiny anyway because targeting individuals based on 
their religious beliefs is incompatible with the Constitution's protection of 
religious exercise. In so arguing, View 2 adherents take their cue from Jus-
tice Kennedy's emphasis on the Constitution's protection of religious rights 
in his Lukumi conclusion: "[U]pon even slight suspicion that proposals for 
state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, 
all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution 
and the rights it secures."48 
i. Applying View 2 (Presumption of Religious Profiling) to the 
Scenarios 
View 2 best conforms to overinclusive police actions against religious 
groups that are based on a generalized threat, as exemplified in Scenario 3. 
The assumption underlying Scenario 3' s interview campaign-that Mus-
lims as a group have information on a general terrorist threat-can easily be 
viewed, adherents of View 2 will argue, as rooted in a stereotyped attribu-
tion of terroristic proclivities to Muslims as a group: why else would the 
FBI take action against all Muslims in a community when it knows only a 
small number of them, if any at all, will have interacted with or have any 
knowledge about terrorist operatives? 
Adherents of View 2 could argue that this interview campaign is not 
merely based on a "suspect description" by analogizing the FBI's treatment 
of Muslims with regard to terrorism to its treatment of Christians with re-
gard to abortion-clinic bombing. View 2 adherents would argue that the 
beliefs of particular Christian denominations create a suspect description for 
potential abortion clinic bombers that suggests-at least in the same attenu-
ated way that all Muslims are supposed to know about terrorist perpetra-
tors-that other Christians may have knowledge about these potential 
bombers. Yet, the FBI does not undertake information gathering efforts di-
rected at all Christians in a community, and this is because it does not stere-
otype all Christians as abortion-clinic bombers or people who are likely to 
48. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547. 
128 UNNERS1TY OF ST. THOMAS IA W JOURNAL [Vol. 4:1 
interact with and be knowledgeable about them; with regard to Muslims and 
terrorist activity, such a stereotype is made. Accordingly, adherents of View 
2 argue, the FBI's overinc1usive targeting of Muslims for its voluntary-in-
terview campaign should be viewed as rooted in discrimination towards 
Muslims. 
Similarly, View 2 adherents will argue that the overinc1usiveness of 
the FBI's denial of crop-duster rentals to all Muslims in Scenario 2 also 
serves as evidence of discrimination towards Muslims. Even though the 
FBI's action in Scenario 2 is based on a specific threat, adherents of View 2 
will argue that the FBI's directive still indicates a discriminatory imputing 
of terrorist inclinations to all Muslims: in imposing a blanket prohibition on 
renting crop-dusters to Muslims, the FBI has failed to acknowledge that 
certain Muslims-particularly those with a verifiable, legitimate need for 
accessing such equipment-pose no terrorist threat. Categorical impositions 
on all Muslims, adherents to View 2 will argue, indicate a discriminatory 
attitude towards Muslims as a group, and such overinclusive measures 
should be subjected to the strict scrutiny that characterizing them as dis-
criminatory will cause. 
When police efforts directed toward Muslims are based on a specific 
threat with specific Muslim suspects-the situation depicted in Scenario 
I-it becomes more difficult for adherents of View 2 to characterize such 
efforts as discriminatory. In Scenario 1, for example, it is most apparent that 
the police are basing their investigation of the Muslim biologists on a par-
ticularized and objective basis-the Islamic references in the note accompa-
nying the anthrax-and not on any prejudice towards Muslims. Still, 
however, an adherent to View 2 could argue that because the purpose of the 
strict scrutiny test is to ensure that the government treats each person as an 
individual without regard for his or her group affiliation,49 any targeting of 
individuals based on their religious beliefs should be evaluated with Lukumi 
strict scrutiny. 
ii. Evaluating the Law Enforcement Action Under Strict 
Scrutiny 
If a court adopts View 2 toward the police action in the scenarios, the 
court will evaluate their actions with a strict scrutiny review, calling upon 
the law-enforcement officials to show that their actions were narrowly tai-
lored to achieve national security interests. 
With regard to Scenarios 2 and 3, the very overinclusiveness that 
served as evidence of the officers' discriminatory intent will also be 
49. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that all 
racial classifications should be subjected to strict scrutiny: "In my mind, government-sponsored 
racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by 
malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple."). 
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grounds for a court to rule that these actions are not narrowly tailored. This 
same strict scrutiny predicament was evident in Lukumi. In that case, the 
Court stated that it assumed discriminatory intent motivated the animal sac-
rifice prohibition because the prohibition was overinclusive: "It is not un-
reasonable to infer . . . that a law which visits gratuitous restrictions on 
religious coIiduct seeks not to effectuate the state governmental interests, 
but to suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation."50 The 
Court then said that this overinclusiveness provided, by itself, sufficient 
grounds to strike down the prohibition: "The absence of narrow tailoring 
suffices to establish the invalidity of the ordinances."51 Similarly, when a 
court considers police action targeting Muslims as a group-in these scena-
rios, through broad-sweeping interview campaigns or through categorical 
prohibitions on their access to certain articles of commerce-as sufficiently 
overinclusive to indicate a discriminatory motive towards Muslims, a court 
would also view these actions as not narrowly tailored to pursue national 
security interests, and deem them unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny 
review. 
On the other hand, the police officers' actions in Scenario 1 may be 
among those "rare cases,"52 as Justice Kennedy in Lukumi put it, when the 
government's targeting of a religious group survives strict scrutiny. With 
the language of the anthrax letter generating a profile of specific Muslim 
suspects, the police have no other means of pursuing national security with-
out targeting individuals based on their Muslim identity: the evidence pro-
vides an unavoidable link between the threat and the religion. 53 Thus, even 
if a court decides that strict scrutiny is warranted for any police action taken 
against an individual based on his or her religious beliefs, when the police, 
in so targeting the individual for his or her beliefs, are acting pursuant to a 
specific threat and a specific suspect description based on religion, the court 
will likely find that the police action is narrowly tailored. 
D. Which View Should Prevail? 
The foregoing section aims to establish that the level of scrutiny with 
which a court will evaluate religious-group targeting is a matter of which 
attitude toward the targeting that the court chooses to embrace. If a court 
adopts View l--employing a presumption that law-enforcement action 
against Muslims is based on suspect description reliance-it would be rec-
ognizing the need of law-enforcement officials to take action based on Mus-
lim identity in a period when Islamic terrorism is the nation's primary 
security threat. If a court adopts View 2-viewing police targeting of relig-
50. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 538 (citation omitted). 
51. [d. at 546. 
52. [d. 
53. See generally Fisher, supra note 44, at 662-73. 
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ious groups as discriminatory treatment warranting strict scrutiny-it would 
be recognizing our nation's commitment to religious liberty. This section 
aims to determine which attitude is most appropriate in the nation's current 
national security climate. In evaluating which attitude is most appropriate, I 
will move to examine the issue in its broader context: the conflict between 
national security concerns and the preservation of the civil rights enshrined 
in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
It can surely be said that the end of national security, as compelling as 
it is, does not justify any means employed by the government to attain it. To 
hear the Supreme Court on this point: "The gravity of the threat alone can-
not be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement 
officers may employ to pursue a given purpose."54 And in particular, Amer-
icans have evinced discomfort with the government's pursuing national se-
curity by taking broad, group-based action. This unease with group-based 
governmental action is evident even during wartime, a point we can con-
clude from our country's lingering shame over the deprivation of Japanese-
Americans' civil rights in Korematsu.55 Thus, even when coping with the 
difficulties of preventing terrorist attacks-a difficulty rooted in their un-
predictable, ever-present imminence-we cannot forget that our constitu-
tional rights are in place in order to maintain a fair and just relationship 
between the government and the citizenry. 
These concerns over violating individuals' constitutional rights (at 
least as they are presently enshrined in Supreme Court jurisprudence) 
would incline us toward adopting View 2 when evaluating law-enforcement 
actions that target Muslims. And given that our current Supreme Court has 
expressed sympathy with these concerns, perhaps we should expect the 
Court to embrace View 2. The Court manifested this sympathy in 2005's 
Johnson v. California. In that case, the Court held that even in the prison 
context, when governmental power over civil liberties is at its fullest, con-
cern about inmates' mortal safety did not justify broad race-based protec-
tive action.56 Given this strong affmnation of civil rights over protective 
measures, perhaps we should not expect the Court to allow its civil-liberties 
jurisprudence to yield alacriously to the pressures of national-security 
exigencies. 
But this Article concludes by urging the courts to adopt View 1, recog-
nizing that the characters of constitutional rights are adaptable to national 
security concerns. Our rights' characters are indeed mutable, a fact that 
54. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85-86 (2001). 
55. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214. 
56. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 500 (2005) (The Supreme Court held that the 
prison's policy of segregating prisoners based on race during the first sixty days of their incarcera-
tion-a policy implemented due to the exigencies of race-based violence-violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment: h[T]he necessities of prison security and discipline are a compelling government 
interest justifying only those uses of race that are narrowly tailored to address those necessities.") 
(citation omitted). 
2006] EYE ON ISLAM 131 
Judge Posner, among others, has deduced from the Constitution's taciturn 
nature. "[T]he Framers left most of the constitutional provisions that confer 
rights pretty vague," writes Posner, "[t]he courts have made them defi-
nite."57 For Posner, because the colors that our civil rights presently possess 
were shaded by judicial interpretation-by judges who were weighing the 
rights' importance against contemporary "public safety" interests-Ameri-
cans should remember that the Constitution and the courts have taken a 
fluid, rather than a doctrinaire, approach to the character of their civil 
rights.58 Based on their fluid character, the qualities of our civil rights are 
malleable by national-security necessities. And this is as it should be, Pos-
ner believes: "[The law] is an instrument for promoting social welfare, and 
as the conditions essential to that welfare change, so must it change."59 Or, 
put more directly, "The Constitution is not a suicide pact."60 Critics may 
charge that adopting this approach to the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
is like having an umbrella that we only take down when it rains. But this 
critique fails to acknowledge the need of our nation's law enforcement 
agencies to take effective countermeasures against what the 9/11 Commis-
sion, as we saw at the beginning of this Article, deemed the "catastrophic 
threat at this moment in history"61-the threat from Islamist terrorists. 
Americans know that aggressive governmental action is the currency 
with which national security is purchased, but they often find it difficult to 
accept governmental action taken on this fundamental truth. Wrote T.S. El-
iot on that score: "It is hard for those who live near a Police Station [t]o 
believe in the triumph of violence.'>62 But in a time of war, Americans 
should recognize that a change in the character of their rights is necessary: 
they should permit the courts to recharacterize their rights as long as the 
courts act responsibly in doing so. Only through such recharacterization can 
judges allow law-enforcement authorities the flexibility they need to ensure 
that the first terrorist attack on U.S. soil was also the last. 
57. Richard A. Posner, Security Versus Civil Uberties, A'ILANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 
46, available at bttp:llwww.theatlantic.comldoc12001121posner. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. 
60. The phrase is a cornmon paraphrasing of Justice Jackson's concluding sentence of bis 
Tenniniello v. City of Chicago dissent: 'There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its 
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into 
a suicide pact" 337 U.S. I, 37 (1949). 
61. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 2. 
62. T.S. ELIOT, THE ROCK 41 (Faber & Faber, Ltd.) (1934). 
